Los márgenes de Abelardo tan solo en Bogotá le dieron la victoria. En relación a Rodolfo Hernández en el 2022, de la Espriella obtuvo 300.000 más votos en la ciudad, lo que hizo que la ventaja de Cepeda respecto a Petro se derrumbara de unos 20 a 8 puntos. En total, la diferencia entre ambos candidatos fue de apenas 250.000 votos: 49,66% frente a 48,7%. Petro y Cepeda cometieron muchos errores: excesos progresistas en temas de género, seguridad, el fundamentalismo climático y la propuesta “tal vez sí tal vez no” de una constituyente.

Aun así, con resultados tan cerrados, la triste realidad es que, de haber jugado bien sus cartas, Cepeda hubiese derrotado a su contrincante. Una de dichas cartas fue su rechazo hacia la camisa de la selección. Esta decisión fue tan estúpida que, por sí sola, pudo haberle costado la elección.

A lo largo de la campaña, de la Espriella y sus seguidores, fánatico de las banderas tanto estadounidenses como israelíes, se apropiaron de la camisa de la selección como parte del disfraz patriota del candidato ateo globalista, neocon de Miami. La respuesta lógica de Cepeda pudiese haber sido de ponerse la bendita camisa y atacar a su oponente tri-ciudadano por no haber vivido en Colombia desde el 2016. En cambio, Cepeda al parecer interpretó a la camisa—en plena Copa Mundial—como una amenaza fascista (el primer partido de Colombia contra Uzbekistán tuvo lugar tres días antes de la segunda vuelta).

En efecto, Cepeda cedió el símbolo nacional del país a un activo extranjero; tal cual como ha ocurrido entre el PT y el bolsonarismo en Brasil. ¿Lo peor de todo? Petro usó la camisa durante toda su presidencia, incluyendo durante la campaña. ¿Es esto así de importante? Sí, el fútbol es una religión en Colombia, y los votantes—especialmente los votantes populares—consideran que ponerse la camiseta, dentro y fuera del Mundial, es de lo más sensato del mundo.

El ejemplo mexicano—otra vez

Miren nada más a la Presidenta Científica de México. Claudia Sheinbaum sí se puso la bella camisa azteca de la selección, Mejor aún: explotó al Mundial para un fin político genial. Consciente de los precios exorbitantes de boletos y de la probable asistencia de mexicanos acomodados afines a la oposición, Sheinbaum optó por donar su boleto inaugural y verse el partido en un barrio popular de Ciudad de México.

¡Bien hecho!

La izquierda debe siempre apoderarse de los símbolos nacionales, sobre todo en momentos de orgullo nacional como el Mundial. Por poco que me agrade el darwinismo libertario de Daniel Di Martino, tuvo razón al ridiculizar a los candidatos progresistas de Nueva York, Adriano Espaillat y Darializa Ávila Chevalier, quienes expresaron una preferencia por países distintos a Estados Unidos durante el Mundial.

La oicofobia progresista (el odio hacia la cultura y nación própia) es uno de tantos males occidentales que sigue propagándose entre la izquierda latinoamericana. Al igual que el fundamentalismo climático, todas las facetas del imperialismo progresista han sido catastróficas.

La 4T es el modelo a seguir.

De la Espriella’s gains in Bogotá alone were enough to give him the win. Compared to Rodolfo Hernandez in 2022, de la Espriella won 300,000 more votes in the city, causing Cepeda’s margins relative to Petro to collapse from roughly 20 to 8 points. All told, the overall difference between both candidates was just 250,000 votes–49.66% to 48.7%. Petro and Cepeda made many mistakes: progressive excesses on gender issues, soft-on-crime policies, braindead climate fundamentalism and an extremely dumb will-they-won’t-they promise to rewrite Colombia’s constitution.

Yet, with results that close, the sad truth is that Cepeda genuinely could have defeated his opponent had he played his cards right. One of these squandered cards was his refusal to wear the football jersey of the country’s national team. This decision was so ludicrously stupid, it alone may have cost him the election.

Throughout the campaign, de la Espriella and his US-and-Israeli-flag-waving supporters savvily adopted the jersey as part of their efforts to patriotwash the Miami Neocon president-elect. The logical and actually patriotic response would have been for Cepeda to put on the damn jersey and attack his tri-citizen opponent for not having lived in Colombia since 2016. Instead, Cepeda evidently interpreted wearing the jersey–in the middle of the world cup–as a show of fascist jingoism (Colombia’s first game against Uzbekistan was three days before the run-off).

In effect, Cepeda ceded the country’s foremost national symbol to a foreign asset; a precise mirroring of the same dynamic between the PT and Bolsonarismo in Brazil. The dumbest part? Petro has and actively wears the damn jersey. Does this really matter that much? Yes, futbol is a religion in Colombia and normie voters–especially working class voters–regard wearing the jersey in and outside the World Cup as common sense.

A Better (Mexican) Way–Again

Go figure, President Girlboss Climate Scientist champions wearing Mexico’s awesome Aztec jersey, huh. Not only that, she exploited hosting the World Cup to brilliant domestic ends. Knowing full well the exorbitant ticket prices and consequent opposition attendance at matches, Sheinbaum opted to donate her inaugural ticket and watch the game in a working class neighborhood of Mexico City.

Now that’s some good politics!

Leftists and especially progressives need to become more comfortable with nationalism, particularly during moments of national pride such as the World Cup. As unfond as I am of libertarian Darwinist Daniel Di Martino, he makes a good point in ridiculing progressive NYC candidates’ Adriano Espaillat and Darializa Ávila Chevalier’s support for countries other than the USA at the World Cup. When libertarian globalists like Di Martino and de la Espriella are more patriotic than self-described democratic socialists, you know you have a problem.

Progressive oikophobia (self-hatred of one’s own culture and nation) is one of many Western cancers that continues to spread among the Latin American Left. Like so-called “criminal justice reform” and climate fundamentalism, it must be purged.

The 4T shows the way.

Days before Colombia’s run-off in which Abelardo de la Espriella won the presidency, I interviewed “Jhon”, a former soldier and victim of Colombia’s ongoing armed conflict. The 30 minute interview was meant to be published by DropSite news prior to the vote but they opted instead to post short clips on X. Naturally, I wanted to put the whole thing out there given how compelling the content is.

Jhon is exactly the kind of voter I love talking to: humble, patriotic, hardworking who votes with the capital P People in mind. I especially admire his deep love of his country which often isn’t the case from many middle and upper class Colombians beyond futbol (Vamos Colombia 2026).

Those who read my recent coverage of the election which includes a mention of Jhon know that I will be the first to say that Petro made many serious mistakes. His government, however, also did many things right so much so that Cepeda nearly prevailed. The video is in Spanish with subtitles. Below is the English transcript with timestamps.

INTERVIEW

JDR: Good afternoon, Jhon. Thank you for speaking with DropSite. Tell us about yourself and what you do here in Bogotá.

John: Thank you for inviting me. I’ve lived here in Bogotá for 23 years. I currently work as an Uber driver, I also do carpentry and whatever else comes up. Bogotá is a very welcoming city, very good for all of us who come to work here in Bogotá and contribute to the city.

JDR: Great. We actually met, you were my Uber driver a few months ago, in April if I remember correctly. We were chatting and you told me a great deal about your life and upbringing. Colombia, as every Colombian knows very well, has had an extremely agitated, bloody and sad recent history.

For decades there’s been an armed conflict between [leftist] guerrillas, [right-wing] paramilitaries, drug traffickers and state violence. And you yourself are a victim of the conflict. You were displaced. You told me that you are from the corregimiento of Tierradentro in Tolima. Tell us about your life there, your childhood, what you saw, etc.

01:26

Jhon: Well, the truth is that since I was little, we always knew about all the armed groups in the countryside. Out there, you’d wake up and if it wasn’t the army, it was any armed group, like the ELN (National Liberation Army), the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the RP. All of those people. And you get used to that life because you have to. We went to school, and ran into those same people. They would ask you where you were going. If they already knew you were going to school, they would ask anyway. And instead of studies what would happen is that the army arrived.

There was fighting all the time. But as I say, here you got used to living that life and other lives. Because there were no other exits. Of course. And tell us about Tierra Dentro, where it is, you were telling me recently about the landscape, its location. Tierra Dentro is a town located in the mountains of northern Tolima, belonging to the municipality of Ibaratolima. It is located near the Nevado del Ruiz, which has a warm and a very welcoming climate. And it grows all kinds of food, great for growing coffee, bananas, everything you could want.

2:50

JDR: You also mentioned to me that during your childhood several of your friends were recruited by the paramilitaries and guerrillas. And you left Tierradentro around 2004, right?

Jhon: I left while I was still studying. Many [of the armed groups] convinced young men to join them and took them away. They went with them because they were convinced to join. Once they left, by the next day; you could see carrying a gun and in uniform.

And I left Tierradentro. I left in 2004 to serve in the military. Because it seemed like the only way out. I saw the military as a way to get ahead. There were no opportunities, but the military opened up opportunities for people like us, people with limited resources.

JDR: And how did you see that many your peers viewed armed groups? Also as an opportunity to get ahead? Or because of political sympathies, for one side or the other, etc.

Jhon: It was more like the kids were shown a rifle and said: “oh, this is cool. It’s going to be easier for me, there will be work”. Many believed them and went. And once they were in, they couldn’t get out. If they did manage to leave that life behind, they would have to go far away otherwise they’d be killed.

4:28

JDR: If you feel comfortable, tell us about the type of violence you witnessed. You told me that you and your father, were ultimately displaced by the paramilitaries.

Jhon: Yes, it started a while ago, going back when Colombia beat Argentina 5-0 [in 1993]. The paramilitaries came in and created panic in the community. They killed and dismembered people. Everyone was leaving. And then only the town remained, it was like a ghost town, with just us left.

There was an old lady that lived close to our home and she couldn’t leave because she was so old. My dad used to tell us that we would stay because we didn’t owe anything to anyone.

That day, when Colombia, I don’t remember the exact date, Colombia beat Argentina 5-0, The day before, we went down to Feria, Tolima, because my dad did business there, buying goods from local farmers and selling them in a cart in Lérida.

So we went to Lerida the next day, a Saturday, The town was full of paramilitaries. So we sold bananas with my dad, we shopped and we went back home. And when we arrived, all the walls were marked, with the name of the paramilitaries.

JDR: The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

Jhon: And that’s how it happened, we were always anxious, because we found out that they were going to kill the guerrillas there. There was combat every day, and sometimes someone would go out into the village whether my dad or I. And fighting would break out; I didn’t know if my dad would catch a stray bullet, or something else. We were in school when soldiers or guerrillas arrived, and there was battle after battle.

06:36

JDR: There’s been a lot of talk about how the government of former President Álvaro Uribe had a lot of connections with paramilitarism, the AUC, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. During your childhood, did you perceive any complicity between the State and right-wing groups?

Jhon: They said it themselves, it’s not surprising, they themselves said that the boss (Uribe) needed to win. And when the army went to towns that [the AUC] controlled, the [fighters] hid and only the commanders came out to meet with the army commanders. And when the AUC arrived in a town they kept a list of people’s [government-provided] national ID numbers.

So, what else can one really say or think to justify having all that information?

07:31

JDR: And when you joined the army, you mentioned that you traveled all over the country, saw the best and the worst of Colombia.

Tell us a little about that, and also about those you served with. As well as the view that the armed forces had of the country, for better and for worse.

Jhon: Well, when I did my military service, they were going to send me to Caquetá, Then later a corporal told me no, because I was going to the army. Then they sent me to the police because the quota was already full in the battalion.

So they were going to send me, they sent me to the police academy. We took some courses in counter-insurgency, which consisted of retaking control of police stations that had been taken over by the guerrillas, in Valle [del Cauca], Dolores, all of that.

They were expecting weapons that never arrived, and they sent us to do a jungle commando seminar. Then they assigned us to bases and sent me to Caquetá but the corporal told me that he wasn’t going to let me go because it was too dangerous.

So I told him, well, I’m here to help and they sent me to Tuluá, in Valle del Cauca. And it was more dangerous there than in Caquetá.

JDR: Both of those were historical FARC strongholds.

Jhon: From there, we belonged to the anti-narcotics group; we searched for drugs. And there’s an antinarcotics base in Tuluá, and a police academy and there were 30 or 40 people were killed weekly in Tuluá alone.

So the armed conflict goes way back for many years. After that, we only patrolled looking for drugs. Then they put us out on the streets to help police patrols to carry out operations, to counteract violence, because it was out of control.

And at that time Mr. Uribe was President. That’s why, because the media doesn’t tell the full truth about the country from what it was about 10 or 15 years ago to what it is now. What we are seeing now in 2026, there’s still violence, but it is not the same as it was before.

JDR: Of course. And when did you leave the army?

Jhon: I left in 2004.

JDR: 2004. And then you came here, and settled in Bogotá.

Jhon: Yes, yes, because I couldn’t go back home so I came here to Bogotá to work, to continue my life.

10:35

JDR: Tell us about your life here in Bogotá.

Jhon: I arrived here in Bogotá, I arrived before in Ibagué, and in Ibagué I called an uncle and I saw that he could help me come and work here, and he said yes, so I came to live in the south [of the city] in a neighborhood called Potosí, later my uncle had a fruit and vegetable business there in Paloquemao. And then he told me to find work at a local company. And that’s where I spent a lot of my life. They called me four days later, and that’s where I started working. And that’s how I ended up living in Bogotá. And I’ve done well thanks to God.

JDR: And you also work as a carpenter now, right? How long have you been doing that?

Jhon: Well, I’ve been doing carpentry for three or four years, more or less.

JDR: Oh, really? What kind of things?

Jhon: Doors, closets, everything..

JDR: You also told that around six years ago you returned to Tierradento for the first time in 15 years and that things have changed a lot for the better. Parts of the Colombian countryside are thriving thankfully. Tell us about what’s happening in your town now.

12:11

Jhon: Well, the truth is that our farm was left all alone because my father also had to leave. And it was left all alone because my dad there alone, he could have been killed. So he left. The farm had coffee, it had bananas everywhere, a nice house and all that, and that’s it.

Six years ago, I asked some cousins, since we still have family there. I asked him how he was and they said that things were good. I told my mother, my mom is here in Bogotá with us, I told her I was going to go work on that farm. It was left alone for 15 years.

I went back, with my mother. We arrived at Díaz de Tolima, we had a car. And the roads were completely destroyed, they were practically dirt tracks. And then I arrived at the farm. And I found our little house made of wood. It’s all crooked, we haven’t fixed it because I haven’t had enough money, but we’re getting there. And I already have coffee planted and all that. I’m already picking coffee, bananas, and yucca too. Things have improved quite a bit, that much has been seen.

JDR: Excellent, excellent.

Colombia now has its first left-wing government, the government of Gustavo Petro. We’re in election season, the second round for the presidency is this Sunday. This government has prioritized a rural areas, investments in the countryside, and agrarian reform precisely to restitute lands taken from victims of the armed conflict, like yourself.

You feel that this government has fulfilled its promises to the countryside and to the victims of the conflict?

14:11

Jhon: For me yes, for me yes, because I went back to my farm right before President Petro assumed office. There were no roads, routes, finished highways, health posts, nothing. Right now you go there, and you see festivities, everyone’s goes there and no one fears, being stopped, that they’ll be killed. None of that. People are planting again, there’s a lot of farms, there is a lot of cultivation. Health posts are now up and running where they were destroyed before. They have nurses available 24 hours a day for any emergency. So you don’t have to go to the main hospital in the city. They take care of you there. They have paved a lot of roads.

So yes, it can be done, when a government wants to work with the people, yes, it can be done. But since there are many benefits given to people in this country who act in their own self-interest. That’s why they haven’t done anything [before] for the countryside.

But a majority in the countryside loves this president you very much for that reason. Because he has cared about the countryside and people have liked the way his government has managed things. Healthcare too, before there were the health brigades. Those existed before Uribe became president and they were destroyed.

Now the medical brigades have returned. So that’s useful for one’s grandparents who can no longer go out all the time because of their age. They arrive at your house, examine you, everything. And if possible, depending on how they see it, they might forward you to a hospital with medications. So there’s definitely been a change.

16:06

JDR: It should be said that in much of the countryside, in rural areas, in the country don’t get great healthcare. It’s often necessary to travel to cities for all kinds of procedures, etc. So that’s very important.

And tell us, Jhon, more or less what your family and friends from Tierradentro have told you. When more or less, did it become peaceful? That the armed groups left, some demobilized, others moved to other areas.

Jhon: That’s what my friends have told me since the 2010s. Because that’s when there was a demobilization. Going back to Santos’ peace process. That helped a lot. Some people say it didn’t help, but for example, in that territory, it helped us a lot.

JDR: The 2016 peace agreement with the FARC.

Jhon: Because those people surrendered completely, they all demobilized. Later, when the paramilitaries went through the JEP, some did mobilize, others did not. And those who remained there had to face the same Colombian military so they left since there were very few. More or less since 2010.

JDR: The special jurisdiction for peace (JEP), the court of justice created by the peace agreement to address past crimes from all actors of the conflict.

Jhon: And that’s when things started to improve a lot. It was over, we were at peace in that territory. But there was no government investment. There were many people who had left, people whose families had been killed. And all the inputs for agricultural products are quite expensive. Back then, people weren’t working. Now, as we saw, investment, road repairs, all the products for crops were cheaper. People are cheerful again and are working.

JDR: Excellent. Jhon, there’s a lot of talk that President Petro is a former guerrilla fighter from the M19. During the current election campaign, it’s been said that what’s happening is that the left, Petro and presidential candidate Iván Cepeda, are allies of the guerrillas, of the FARC dissidents, ELN, etc. You have a unique point of view, how do you view past and present guerrillas? Do you them as true ideological actors or more so as criminals? Do you see differences between the political left and the armed left?

Jhon: I always saw guerrillas differently. The truth is I never heard them talk about politics. And the other thing, well, President Petro, although he was part of M19, I hadn’t been born yet. I cannot judge him. And Cepeda, the candidate, well, he...it’s no secret that his father was killed. That’s still unknown, and who killed him.

JDR: Manuel Cepeda, yes.

They are believed to have been state agents, thus allied with paramilitarism in the 90s. He was a very important leader of the Communist Party at the time. The Patriotic Union. Which suffered a genocide. They were devastated.

Jhon: And, for example, here in Colombia, there may be guerrillas, but not as many as they claim. In fact, those who remain, are mostly around borders. Because this government already has approved investment to various departments where the peasants didn’t even have roads, now..many have substituted the cultivation of coca for coffee, bananas, and pancoher. So, the armed groups no longer have coca. There may be cocaine, but it’s much further removed, like at the borders with other countries.

So, that helps to lessen war a little bit. Because we also have many farmers who are tired of the war. And I don’t think that guerrillas are allied with these candidates. The problem we have here is that we have a mirror image like Venezuela or Cuba. They say that the left is the worst, that the left is going to ruin the country, no. For me, the [political] left here in Colombia isn’t a [communist] left, it’s more like the center.

Look at what the country had when President Petro came in; he hasn’t ruined the country. That the country is going to end, no, I would have put 10,000 pesos on it. Right now, the peso has gained value relative to the dollar.

JDR: It has strengthened, yes, yes.

Jhon: That’s good for us, but is bad for the far right. Those who have a great interests in the country. For them everything is bad, if [the dollar] is expensive, if it’s cheap it’s also bad. So we as a people are also allowing ourselves to be very divided.

21:43

JDR: It should also be noted that Petro’s government has fought against several guerrilla groups, FARC dissidents, who chose not to take part in the 2016 peace process, the ELN and several other groups, including the Clan del Golfo. So certainly some of these narratives are simplistic.

Jhon: Yes, and for some, the peace process didn’t work. But the peace process, when one looks at analyzes it thoroughly, it serve the country well because many people demobilized. You go to Caquetá, to a large part of where the demobilized are and those people are working, they are sowing seeds, they are already seeking civilian life, which is the best for the country, the best for all farming families.

Because in violence, you know that in a war, all the peasants are always involved. All the people under little resources, everyday people, as we say here in Colombia. So it’s very easy to start a war, but when it comes to achieving peace, they don’t look for solutions. But from the process of everything that’s being done, the process that the JEP is doing. All of that is good for the country.

JDR: Of course.

Jhon: Because they keep searching for a truth that everyone knows, but here they don’t want to accept it.

JDR: Yes, yes, the right-wing candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella has said that he wants to get rid of the JEP. And that’s a historical promise of Uribismo. The Colombian right claims that the JEP has been politicized although it has investigated the crimes from both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries.

It’s been said that the peace agreement with the FARC opened up a space for the political left that didn’t exist before. Previously, left-wing candidates received a very minimal percentage of votes in national elections and congress. Now, Petro’s party, the Pacto Historico, has grown a lot in Congress and both he and Cepeda also achieved historic vote shares.

You think this is a healthy thing for the country, for pluralism and progress in that regard?

24:22

Jhon: Well, for me, my way of looking at and analyzing things is important because never before have so many people been involved in politics, everyone is talking to him about politics.

JDR: The turnout for the first round of the presidential election was also historic. Like 58% or 57%, which is absurd in Colombia. People are generally indifferent.

Jhon: And that’s good for the country, that everyone is involved in politics. Because that’s what a democracy is about: respecting everyone’s opinions which was something that wasn’t seen before. These days, everywhere you go, everyone talks to you about politics. And for me, it’s very good for the country because it shows that we’re entering into a process of change in the country.

And that’s what Petro’s achieved; it’s the Pacto Historico that has given us that voice to people with limited resources, working people. Jhon, I wanted to ask, in a way you have a profile which should be more right-leaning.

JDR: You are very bootstrapping, you work driving, growing coffee, carpentry etc. The common argument from the right is that the left does not value work and that everything is about giving money away. Welfare, etc. What would you say to that?

25:52

Jhon: We don’t want anything for free. We want [our leaders] to manage the country’s resources well in favor of the people. Not that just because I have power I’m going to steal all that money. And that’s what they want to sell, that the left just gives things away. That the left, that they teach laziness, no.

That’s not what we want, we want to work in peace. That the government helps us with projects, and that all taxes are well managed that we pay for, because that money doesn’t belong to the politicians or whoever is running the country, it is a tax on the people. But they want to sell us this idea that if you’re left-wing, you’re lazy, if you’re right-wing then you’re a hard worker.

JDR: That you’re an entrepreneur, a businessman, etc.

Jhon: Yes and I’ve seen many people who are big fans of Gustavo Petro. They are businessmen, people who have money too. It’s not about whether you like to work. That if you’re left-wing you don’t like to work. There are right-wing like that too...but lately here in our country, all the benefits were always for those who have more. Now the Petro government has worked for everyone.

JDR: Hence the idea of a living wage, raising the minimum wage, precisely so that people can have decent jobs, that they are paid well and can support themselves, to get ahead, without needing state assistance, or be recruited by some gang or whatever.

Jhon: We don’t want handouts, or for people to lack opportunities. And that’s what this government is doing. Giving us opportunities. Right now, the minimum wage, the overtime pay, all of that existed before. But Uribe got rid of it, and now this government has restored it. So, yes, Petro is working for ordinary people. We don’t need them to suddenly take away from those that have the most. Equal opportunities for everyone so that the opportunities are for everyone. That’s what a democracy is about, not just giving to some and not to others.

28:22

JDR: If de la Espriella wins, what do you think the future of the left should be?

Jhon: If a right-wing government tries to undo what this governmet has done Regarding the current government, etc., we’ll have to wait and see what happens. Because it’s very easy to talk, to do. There are many associations that have been working together for a long time. And that’s not what Mr. Abelardo says.

“I’m going in and putting an end to this and that.” No, if he wins, then we’ll have to wait, because that’s not going to happen. They don’t make all the decisions. That’s what the Senate and the House are for. And we the people have the final say. People are no longer willing to be manipulated as they were in the past.

Back in the old days, they used to say things like, “Well, you’re a liberal,” or “You’re a conservative.” So even if the conservatives were stealing, “I’m a conservative, so I vote for them.” No, not anymore, nowadays even the youngest children. They know what politics is.

JDR: At the local level, there’s a lot of talk about political machines. These political machines advocate for governors who buy votes, etc. But the curious thing is that now, at a national level, that is seen less and less. People are truly voting more freely, not simply what they’re told.

30:14

Jhon: Yes, that’s great.

Because then how are we going to change as a country? And we, as a people, started the corruption. So if we don’t sell our votes, well, that’s enough to say, oh well, we’re going to have to change the way we work. what we’re going to do. And most departments already. There are many people who are voting according to their conscience. Not allowing themselves to be manipulated, to be forced to sell their vote, or to be coerced.

The thing is, nowadays, well, the channels that broadcast from this country only talk about the bad things about it. They don’t talk about the good things in the country. In my opinion, if it’s a democratic country, they should talk about everything. The good and the bad. It’s too big a country. And it doesn’t take four years to fix it. That takes many years. For decades, the right wing said they would fix the country. They were there for eight to ten years and what did they do? Nothing.

31:24

JDR: Jhon, this is the last question. Is there anything else you’d like to say? to an international audience, something you think is important for people to know about Colombia, about your own experiences? Regarding past presidents, the future president,

Jhon: what I would say to everyone is...that Colombia is a very beautiful, very good country. Don’t believe all the bad news you hear and choose not to visit because Colombia has so much nature. So much to see, our country is so beautiful. And I extend an invitation to everyone who wants to go to Colombia. That they come to our country and enjoy what we have to offer.

JDR: In Tierradentro.

Jhon: In Tierradentro.

Jhon is exactly the kind of voter I love talking to: humble, patriotic, hardworking who votes with the capital P People in mind. I especially admire his deep love of his country which often isn’t the case from many middle and upper class Colombians beyond futbol (Vamos Colombia 2026).

Those who read my recent coverage of the election which includes a mention of Jhon know that I will be the first to say that Petro made many serious mistakes. His government, however, also did many things so much so that Cepeda nearly prevailed. The video is in Spanish with subtitles. Below is the English transcript with timestamps.

INTERVIEW

JDR: Good afternoon, Jhon. Thank you for speaking with DropSite. Tell us about yourself and what you do here in Bogotá.

John: Thank you for inviting me. I’ve lived here in Bogotá for 23 years. I currently work as an Uber driver, I also do carpentry and whatever else comes up. Bogotá is a very welcoming city, very good for all of us who come to work here in Bogotá and contribute to the city.

JDR: Great. We actually met, you were my Uber driver a few months ago, in April if I remember correctly. We were chatting and you told me a great deal about your life and upbringing. Colombia, as every Colombian knows very well, has had an extremely agitated, bloody and sad recent history.

For decades there’s been an armed conflict between [leftist] guerrillas, [right-wing] paramilitaries, drug traffickers and state violence. And you yourself are a victim of the conflict. You were displaced. You told me that you are from the corregimiento of Tierradentro in Tolima. Tell us about your life there, your childhood, what you saw, etc.

01:26

Jhon: Well, the truth is that since I was little, we always knew about all the armed groups in the countryside. Out there, you’d wake up and if it wasn’t the army, it was any armed group, like the ELN (National Liberation Army), the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the RP. All of those people. And you get used to that life because you have to. We went to school, and ran into those same people. They would ask you where you were going. If they already knew you were going to school, they would ask anyway. And instead of studies what would happen is that the army arrived.

There was fighting all the time. But as I say, here you got used to living that life and other lives. Because there were no other exits. Of course. And tell us about Tierra Dentro, where it is, you were telling me recently about the landscape, its location. Tierra Dentro is a town located in the mountains of northern Tolima, belonging to the municipality of Ibaratolima. It is located near the Nevado del Ruiz, which has a warm and a very welcoming climate. And it grows all kinds of food, great for growing coffee, bananas, everything you could want.

2:50

JDR: You also mentioned to me that during your childhood several of your friends were recruited by the paramilitaries and guerrillas. And you left Tierradentro around 2004, right?

Jhon: I left while I was still studying. Many [of the armed groups] convinced young men to join them and took them away. They went with them because they were convinced to join. Once they left, by the next day; you could see carrying a gun and in uniform.

And I left Tierradentro. I left in 2004 to serve in the military. Because it seemed like the only way out. I saw the military as a way to get ahead. There were no opportunities, but the military opened up opportunities for people like us, people with limited resources.

JDR: And how did you see that many your peers viewed armed groups? Also as an opportunity to get ahead? Or because of political sympathies, for one side or the other, etc.

Jhon: It was more like the kids were shown a rifle and said: “oh, this is cool. It’s going to be easier for me, there will be work”. Many believed them and went. And once they were in, they couldn’t get out. If they did manage to leave that life behind, they would have to go far away otherwise they’d be killed.

4:28

JDR: If you feel comfortable, tell us about the type of violence you witnessed. You told me that you and your father, were ultimately displaced by the paramilitaries.

Jhon: Yes, it started a while ago, going back when Colombia beat Argentina 5-0 [in 1993]. The paramilitaries came in and created panic in the community. They killed and dismembered people. Everyone was leaving. And then only the town remained, it was like a ghost town, with just us left.

There was an old lady that lived close to our home and she couldn’t leave because she was so old. My dad used to tell us that we would stay because we didn’t owe anything to anyone.

That day, when Colombia, I don’t remember the exact date, Colombia beat Argentina 5-0, The day before, we went down to Feria, Tolima, because my dad did business there, buying goods from local farmers and selling them in a cart in Lérida.

So we went to Lerida the next day, a Saturday, The town was full of paramilitaries. So we sold bananas with my dad, we shopped and we went back home. And when we arrived, all the walls were marked, with the name of the paramilitaries.

JDR: The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

Jhon: And that’s how it happened, we were always anxious, because we found out that they were going to kill the guerrillas there. There was combat every day, and sometimes someone would go out into the village whether my dad or I. And fighting would break out; I didn’t know if my dad would catch a stray bullet, or something else. We were in school when soldiers or guerrillas arrived, and there was battle after battle.

06:36

JDR: There’s been a lot of talk about how the government of former President Álvaro Uribe had a lot of connections with paramilitarism, the AUC, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. During your childhood, did you perceive any complicity between the State and right-wing groups?

Jhon: They said it themselves, it’s not surprising, they themselves said that the boss (Uribe) needed to win. And when the army went to towns that [the AUC] controlled, the [fighters] hid and only the commanders came out to meet with the army commanders. And when the AUC arrived in a town they kept a list of people’s [government-provided] national ID numbers.

So, what else can one really say or think to justify having all that information?

07:31

JDR: And when you joined the army, you mentioned that you traveled all over the country, saw the best and the worst of Colombia.

Tell us a little about that, and also about those you served with. As well as the view that the armed forces had of the country, for better and for worse.

Jhon: Well, when I did my military service, they were going to send me to Caquetá, Then later a corporal told me no, because I was going to the army. Then they sent me to the police because the quota was already full in the battalion.

So they were going to send me, they sent me to the police academy. We took some courses in counter-insurgency, which consisted of retaking control of police stations that had been taken over by the guerrillas, in Valle [del Cauca], Dolores, all of that.

They were expecting weapons that never arrived, and they sent us to do a jungle commando seminar. Then they assigned us to bases and sent me to Caquetá but the corporal told me that he wasn’t going to let me go because it was too dangerous.

So I told him, well, I’m here to help and they sent me to Tuluá, in Valle del Cauca. And it was more dangerous there than in Caquetá.

JDR: Both of those were historical FARC strongholds.

Jhon: From there, we belonged to the anti-narcotics group; we searched for drugs. And there’s an antinarcotics base in Tuluá, and a police academy and there were 30 or 40 people were killed weekly in Tuluá alone.

So the armed conflict goes way back for many years. After that, we only patrolled looking for drugs. Then they put us out on the streets to help police patrols to carry out operations, to counteract violence, because it was out of control.

And at that time Mr. Uribe was President. That’s why, because the media doesn’t tell the full truth about the country from what it was about 10 or 15 years ago to what it is now. What we are seeing now in 2026, there’s still violence, but it is not the same as it was before.

JDR: Of course. And when did you leave the army?

Jhon: I left in 2004.

JDR: 2004. And then you came here, and settled in Bogotá.

Jhon: Yes, yes, because I couldn’t go back home so I came here to Bogotá to work, to continue my life.

10:35

JDR: Tell us about your life here in Bogotá.

Jhon: I arrived here in Bogotá, I arrived before in Ibagué, and in Ibagué I called an uncle and I saw that he could help me come and work here, and he said yes, so I came to live in the south [of the city] in a neighborhood called Potosí, later my uncle had a fruit and vegetable business there in Paloquemao. And then he told me to find work at a local company. And that’s where I spent a lot of my life. They called me four days later, and that’s where I started working. And that’s how I ended up living in Bogotá. And I’ve done well thanks to God.

JDR: And you also work as a carpenter now, right? How long have you been doing that?

Jhon: Well, I’ve been doing carpentry for three or four years, more or less.

JDR: Oh, really? What kind of things?

Jhon: Doors, closets, everything..

JDR: You also told that around six years ago you returned to Tierradento for the first time in 15 years and that things have changed a lot for the better. Parts of the Colombian countryside are thriving thankfully. Tell us about what’s happening in your town now.

12:11

Jhon: Well, the truth is that our farm was left all alone because my father also had to leave. And it was left all alone because my dad there alone, he could have been killed. So he left. The farm had coffee, it had bananas everywhere, a nice house and all that, and that’s it.

Six years ago, I asked some cousins, since we still have family there. I asked him how he was and they said that things were good. I told my mother, my mom is here in Bogotá with us, I told her I was going to go work on that farm. It was left alone for 15 years.

I went back, with my mother. We arrived at Díaz de Tolima, we had a car. And the roads were completely destroyed, they were practically dirt tracks. And then I arrived at the farm. And I found our little house made of wood. It’s all crooked, we haven’t fixed it because I haven’t had enough money, but we’re getting there. And I already have coffee planted and all that. I’m already picking coffee, bananas, and yucca too. Things have improved quite a bit, that much has been seen.

JDR: Excellent, excellent.

Colombia now has its first left-wing government, the government of Gustavo Petro. We’re in election season, the second round for the presidency is this Sunday. This government has prioritized a rural areas, investments in the countryside, and agrarian reform precisely to restitute lands taken from victims of the armed conflict, like yourself.

You feel that this government has fulfilled its promises to the countryside and to the victims of the conflict?

14:11

Jhon: For me yes, for me yes, because I went back to my farm right before President Petro assumed office. There were no roads, routes, finished highways, health posts, nothing. Right now you go there, and you see festivities, everyone’s goes there and no one fears, being stopped, that they’ll be killed. None of that. People are planting again, there’s a lot of farms, there is a lot of cultivation. Health posts are now up and running where they were destroyed before. They have nurses available 24 hours a day for any emergency. So you don’t have to go to the main hospital in the city. They take care of you there. They have paved a lot of roads.

So yes, it can be done, when a government wants to work with the people, yes, it can be done. But since there are many benefits given to people in this country who act in their own self-interest. That’s why they haven’t done anything [before] for the countryside.

But a majority in the countryside loves this president you very much for that reason. Because he has cared about the countryside and people have liked the way his government has managed things. Healthcare too, before there were the health brigades. Those existed before Uribe became president and they were destroyed.

Now the medical brigades have returned. So that’s useful for one’s grandparents who can no longer go out all the time because of their age. They arrive at your house, examine you, everything. And if possible, depending on how they see it, they might forward you to a hospital with medications. So there’s definitely been a change.

16:06

JDR: It should be said that in much of the countryside, in rural areas, in the country don’t get great healthcare. It’s often necessary to travel to cities for all kinds of procedures, etc. So that’s very important.

And tell us, Jhon, more or less what your family and friends from Tierradentro have told you. When more or less, did it become peaceful? That the armed groups left, some demobilized, others moved to other areas.

Jhon: That’s what my friends have told me since the 2010s. Because that’s when there was a demobilization. Going back to Santos’ peace process. That helped a lot. Some people say it didn’t help, but for example, in that territory, it helped us a lot.

JDR: The 2016 peace agreement with the FARC.

Jhon: Because those people surrendered completely, they all demobilized. Later, when the paramilitaries went through the JEP, some did mobilize, others did not. And those who remained there had to face the same Colombian military so they left since there were very few. More or less since 2010.

JDR: The special jurisdiction for peace (JEP), the court of justice created by the peace agreement to address past crimes from all actors of the conflict.

Jhon: And that’s when things started to improve a lot. It was over, we were at peace in that territory. But there was no government investment. There were many people who had left, people whose families had been killed. And all the inputs for agricultural products are quite expensive. Back then, people weren’t working. Now, as we saw, investment, road repairs, all the products for crops were cheaper. People are cheerful again and are working.

JDR: Excellent. Jhon, there’s a lot of talk that President Petro is a former guerrilla fighter from the M19. During the current election campaign, it’s been said that what’s happening is that the left, Petro and presidential candidate Iván Cepeda, are allies of the guerrillas, of the FARC dissidents, ELN, etc. You have a unique point of view, how do you view past and present guerrillas? Do you them as true ideological actors or more so as criminals? Do you see differences between the political left and the armed left?

Jhon: I always saw guerrillas differently. The truth is I never heard them talk about politics. And the other thing, well, President Petro, although he was part of M19, I hadn’t been born yet. I cannot judge him. And Cepeda, the candidate, well, he...it’s no secret that his father was killed. That’s still unknown, and who killed him.

JDR: Manuel Cepeda, yes.

They are believed to have been state agents, thus allied with paramilitarism in the 90s. He was a very important leader of the Communist Party at the time. The Patriotic Union. Which suffered a genocide. They were devastated.

Jhon: And, for example, here in Colombia, there may be guerrillas, but not as many as they claim. In fact, those who remain, are mostly around borders. Because this government already has approved investment to various departments where the peasants didn’t even have roads, now..many have substituted the cultivation of coca for coffee, bananas, and pancoher. So, the armed groups no longer have coca. There may be cocaine, but it’s much further removed, like at the borders with other countries.

So, that helps to lessen war a little bit. Because we also have many farmers who are tired of the war. And I don’t think that guerrillas are allied with these candidates. The problem we have here is that we have a mirror image like Venezuela or Cuba. They say that the left is the worst, that the left is going to ruin the country, no. For me, the [political] left here in Colombia isn’t a [communist] left, it’s more like the center.

Look at what the country had when President Petro came in; he hasn’t ruined the country. That the country is going to end, no, I would have put 10,000 pesos on it. Right now, the peso has gained value relative to the dollar.

JDR: It has strengthened, yes, yes.

Jhon: That’s good for us, but is bad for the far right. Those who have a great interests in the country. For them everything is bad, if [the dollar] is expensive, if it’s cheap it’s also bad. So we as a people are also allowing ourselves to be very divided.

21:43

JDR: It should also be noted that Petro’s government has fought against several guerrilla groups, FARC dissidents, who chose not to take part in the 2016 peace process, the ELN and several other groups, including the Clan del Golfo. So certainly some of these narratives are simplistic.

Jhon: Yes, and for some, the peace process didn’t work. But the peace process, when one looks at analyzes it thoroughly, it serve the country well because many people demobilized. You go to Caquetá, to a large part of where the demobilized are and those people are working, they are sowing seeds, they are already seeking civilian life, which is the best for the country, the best for all farming families.

Because in violence, you know that in a war, all the peasants are always involved. All the people under little resources, everyday people, as we say here in Colombia. So it’s very easy to start a war, but when it comes to achieving peace, they don’t look for solutions. But from the process of everything that’s being done, the process that the JEP is doing. All of that is good for the country.

JDR: Of course.

Jhon: Because they keep searching for a truth that everyone knows, but here they don’t want to accept it.

JDR: Yes, yes, the right-wing candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella has said that he wants to get rid of the JEP. And that’s a historical promise of Uribismo. The Colombian right claims that the JEP has been politicized although it has investigated the crimes from both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries.

It’s been said that the peace agreement with the FARC opened up a space for the political left that didn’t exist before. Previously, left-wing candidates received a very minimal percentage of votes in national elections and congress. Now, Petro’s party, the Pacto Historico, has grown a lot in Congress and both he and Cepeda also achieved historic vote shares.

You think this is a healthy thing for the country, for pluralism and progress in that regard?

24:22

Jhon: Well, for me, my way of looking at and analyzing things is important because never before have so many people been involved in politics, everyone is talking to him about politics.

JDR: The turnout for the first round of the presidential election was also historic. Like 58% or 57%, which is absurd in Colombia. People are generally indifferent.

Jhon: And that’s good for the country, that everyone is involved in politics. Because that’s what a democracy is about: respecting everyone’s opinions which was something that wasn’t seen before. These days, everywhere you go, everyone talks to you about politics. And for me, it’s very good for the country because it shows that we’re entering into a process of change in the country.

And that’s what Petro’s achieved; it’s the Pacto Historico that has given us that voice to people with limited resources, working people. Jhon, I wanted to ask, in a way you have a profile which should be more right-leaning.

JDR: You are very bootstrapping, you work driving, growing coffee, carpentry etc. The common argument from the right is that the left does not value work and that everything is about giving money away. Welfare, etc. What would you say to that?

25:52

Jhon: We don’t want anything for free. We want [our leaders] to manage the country’s resources well in favor of the people. Not that just because I have power I’m going to steal all that money. And that’s what they want to sell, that the left just gives things away. That the left, that they teach laziness, no.

That’s not what we want, we want to work in peace. That the government helps us with projects, and that all taxes are well managed that we pay for, because that money doesn’t belong to the politicians or whoever is running the country, it is a tax on the people. But they want to sell us this idea that if you’re left-wing, you’re lazy, if you’re right-wing then you’re a hard worker.

JDR: That you’re an entrepreneur, a businessman, etc.

Jhon: Yes and I’ve seen many people who are big fans of Gustavo Petro. They are businessmen, people who have money too. It’s not about whether you like to work. That if you’re left-wing you don’t like to work. There are right-wing like that too...but lately here in our country, all the benefits were always for those who have more. Now the Petro government has worked for everyone.

JDR: Hence the idea of a living wage, raising the minimum wage, precisely so that people can have decent jobs, that they are paid well and can support themselves, to get ahead, without needing state assistance, or be recruited by some gang or whatever.

Jhon: We don’t want handouts, or for people to lack opportunities. And that’s what this government is doing. Giving us opportunities. Right now, the minimum wage, the overtime pay, all of that existed before. But Uribe got rid of it, and now this government has restored it. So, yes, Petro is working for ordinary people. We don’t need them to suddenly take away from those that have the most. Equal opportunities for everyone so that the opportunities are for everyone. That’s what a democracy is about, not just giving to some and not to others.

28:22

JDR: If de la Espriella wins, what do you think the future of the left should be?

Jhon: If a right-wing government tries to undo what this governmet has done Regarding the current government, etc., we’ll have to wait and see what happens. Because it’s very easy to talk, to do. There are many associations that have been working together for a long time. And that’s not what Mr. Abelardo says.

“I’m going in and putting an end to this and that.” No, if he wins, then we’ll have to wait, because that’s not going to happen. They don’t make all the decisions. That’s what the Senate and the House are for. And we the people have the final say. People are no longer willing to be manipulated as they were in the past.

Back in the old days, they used to say things like, “Well, you’re a liberal,” or “You’re a conservative.” So even if the conservatives were stealing, “I’m a conservative, so I vote for them.” No, not anymore, nowadays even the youngest children. They know what politics is.

JDR: At the local level, there’s a lot of talk about political machines. These political machines advocate for governors who buy votes, etc. But the curious thing is that now, at a national level, that is seen less and less. People are truly voting more freely, not simply what they’re told.

30:14

Jhon: Yes, that’s great.

Because then how are we going to change as a country? And we, as a people, started the corruption. So if we don’t sell our votes, well, that’s enough to say, oh well, we’re going to have to change the way we work. what we’re going to do. And most departments already. There are many people who are voting according to their conscience. Not allowing themselves to be manipulated, to be forced to sell their vote, or to be coerced.

The thing is, nowadays, well, the channels that broadcast from this country only talk about the bad things about it. They don’t talk about the good things in the country. In my opinion, if it’s a democratic country, they should talk about everything. The good and the bad. It’s too big a country. And it doesn’t take four years to fix it. That takes many years. For decades, the right wing said they would fix the country. They were there for eight to ten years and what did they do? Nothing.

31:24

JDR: Jhon, this is the last question. Is there anything else you’d like to say? to an international audience, something you think is important for people to know about Colombia, about your own experiences? Regarding past presidents, the future president,

Jhon: what I would say to everyone is...that Colombia is a very beautiful, very good country. Don’t believe all the bad news you hear and choose not to visit because Colombia has so much nature. So much to see, our country is so beautiful. And I extend an invitation to everyone who wants to go to Colombia. That they come to our country and enjoy what we have to offer.

JDR: In Tierradentro.

Jhon: In Tierradentro.

Whatever its director’s precise intentions, none of these readings are particularly compelling and ironically validate the dead end near future portrayed in the film.

One Battle After Another is a loose adaptation of the 1990 novel, Vineland, by Thomas Pynchon. Both the novel and film recount a convoluted interplay over a course of 16 years between former revolutionaries and agents of a right-wing police state. Many scenes in the film are eerily reminiscent of ICE and CBP enforcement surges in Los Angeles and Minneapolis under the second Trump administration. The fact that One Battle finished filming well before Trump’s 2024 reelection speaks to an almost unintended foresight from the director. Anderson, moreover, previously adapted Pynchon’s Inherent Vice in 2014 and had long expressed interest in bringing some form of Vineland to the big screen.

Unlike the novel–which takes place during the 1980s–the issue of greatest political contention in the film is immigration. Leonardo DiCaprio’s protagonist, Bob Ferguson is initially part of the French 75, a modern-day Weather Underground. It’s telling and painfully appropriate, however, that the group’s stated ideology is purely of the culturally progressive variety. Ferguson’s pursuer and antagonist, Colonel Steven Lockjaw, played by Sean Penn, is an idiosyncratic, nativist executor of mass deportations and repression against insurgent groups like the French 75.

At no point in the film do proponents of revolution or regime partisans advocate for raising wages, making housing more affordable, decoupling from foreign clients’ costly wars or–most notably–punishing employers of illegal labor. Instead, the priorities of the French 75 as described by the militant Jungle Pussy are, “Free bodies, free borders, free choices, and freedom from fucking fear.” The guerrilla’s chief modus operandi consists of robbing banks and freeing illegal immigrants from state detention–a cause certain to rouse working class Americans. Accordingly, the right-wing regime embodied by Lockjaw is hell bent on a performative and selective deportation regime headed by a cabal of oligarchs that shamelessly exploit illegal labor.

The reality depicted in One Battle is disturbingly plausible. After leaving the French 75, Ferguson and his surrogate daughter, Willa (Chase Infiniti) are revealed to have settled in Baktan Cross, a fictional sanctuary city in California. One officer explains to Colonel Lockjaw to expect local sympathy towards targeted terrorist groups when planning a military intervention in Baktan Cross. No mention is made of elected officials or political parties in the film leaving the country’s decade-plus status quo open to the viewer’s imagination.

The most logical interpretation is that progressive enclaves continue to enjoy democratically elected governments while a right-wing regime exercises national hegemony, presumably through some degree of foul play. Clearly, however, the trappings of the country’s constitutional tradition survive to some extent in One Battle. It’s conceivable that the mere existence of the French 75 helped bolster popular support for right-wing rule. In Colombia, decades of terrorism from the FARC cratered support for the political left up until the guerrillas demobilized in 2017. The fact that popular causes such as land reform were discredited in a country as disadvantaged as Colombia speaks to the often counterproductive nature of armed struggle–much less one geared towards open borders.

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Pacto Histórico (PH) - Historic Pact (Left-wing, Ruling Party)

Founded by President Petro, the PH is technically a coalition of multiple left-wing parties ranging from the far-to-center left. In his typical over-the-top grandstanding, Petro said during a debate in 2022, “El Pacto Histórico no es un partido, es una forma de gobernar—the Historic Pact isn’t a party, it’s a method of governing” (Facepalm). In practice, the party runs the gamut from former and possibly still actual communists, social democrats, laborists, climate fundamentalists and identitarians of various stripes.

The former three have redeeming qualities as shown by the administration’s recent turnaround in favor of raising wages, state capitalism and saber-rattling against Washington—the latter two not so much… Conversely, a small number of PH officials such as the recently deceased Piedad Córdoba are overt apologists for left-wing dictatorships. Most such as Petro and PH presidential candidate Iván Cepeda dance around the issue incoherently as is typical of leftist parties in the region.

The PH won at least 25 seats in the Senate and 40 in the House of Representatives. This is the most seats that a single political party has won since 2010, up five in the Senate and 12 in the House of Representatives since 2022. All told, the party secured 4.4 million votes in the Senate.

Alianza Verde (AV) - Green Alliance (Left-of-center, Pro-Government)

Historically, AV has been one of Colombia’s most important parties left-of-center. Most of its elected officials are supportive of the Petro administration with many identifying as Petristas. Some are more centrist and one of its senators, JP Hernández, a finger-in-the-wing populist, is openly anti-Petro; I could see him eventually opposing a President Valencia or De La Espriella. Ironically, Hernandez was the party’s most voted senator thanks to his large following as an influencer prior to his election in 2022. As its name suggests, AV is keen on green politics though there are exceptions. The gamut of its elected officials runs farther to the center and right than PH but it is a mostly progressive party. This time around, the party will have 10 senators and 5 representatives in Congress.

Centro Democrático (CD) - Democratic Center (Right-wing, Opposition)

Founded by controversial former president Álvaro Uribe, CD is effectively a cult of personality around Uribe. The former president is both esteemed and hated for a crackdown against the now defunct FARC and ELN that dramatically improved security at the cost of thousands of extrajudicial killings of civilians. His government had disturbingly close ties to right-wing narcoparamilitaries of United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and he has been plagued with legal issues since leaving the presidency. CD’s adherents form part of Uribismo which promotes the former president’s policies of limited government, hardline security policies and Christian Nationalism. Its presidential candidate is Paloma Valencia who won and secured a surprising number of votes in her respective consulta. CD won 17 senators and 23 representatives.

Salvación Nacional (SN) - National Salvation (Right-wing, Opposition)

SN was originally founded by legacy Conservative, Álvaro Gómez, who was assassinated in 1995 and is now led by Enrique Gómez. Álvaro and Enrique are the son and grandson of Laureano Gómez, a fascistic leader of the Conservative Party who fomented much of the bloodshed of the La Violencia civil war during the 1940s and 1950s. Álvaro was a more moderate but also interesting conservative who later broke with his party. His son, Enrique, has thrown his lot in with Uribismo. SN’s presidential candidate is independent Uribista and right-wing frontrunner Abelardo De La Espriella, who ruled out a primary with Valencia and other right-wing candidates due to his strength in the polls. SN had struggled to make it into congress under Gómez but will now serve as essentially a satellite of CD with it’s four senators and one representative.

The Colombian Centrão: Partido Liberal, Partido Conservador, Partido De La U, Cambio Radical (Amorphous, Clientelistic)

Colombia’s legislative politics are remarkably similar to those of Brazil though there is thankfully a smaller absolute number of parties. In Brazil, there are parties on the left and right with clearly defined ideologies such the PT, PSOL, PSDB and PL. In the middle is the so-called Centrão composed of ‘centrist’ parties, which comprise a majority of congress, and serve largely as crime syndicates hell bent on securing graft from incumbent governments. The same more or less applies in Colombia. Historically, the Liberal and Conservative parties maintained a duopoly over Colombian politics throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Technically, the Partido De La U (PdU) and Cambio Radical (CR) are offshoots of the Liberal Party.

In practice, all three of these parties as well the Conservatives live to extract graft from incumbents as well as maintain local fiefdoms where retain greater influence. At this point, none of these parties are viable for the presidency though they opportunistically back one or another candidate. In 2022, the leadership and most elected officials of all four parties declined to back Petro though that may well change this time around. The leader of the Liberal Party, Cesar Gaviria, for instance, despises Petro but an increasing share of the party’s members in congress back the president such as Maria Eugenia Lopera who was the most voted Liberal senator. The Conservative Party is indeed more to the right than its peers on balance but actually backed Petro during the first year of his term.

Congressional Outlook

Depending on your political orientation, there are glass half empty, half full takeaways from the congressional vote. Both the following are true, the next congress will be more favorable towards Cepeda should he win than the current one is towards Petro. At the same time, Uribismo will be stronger in the next congressional term. If Valencia or De La Espriella win the presidency, they will probably enjoy decent governability but also face stiffer resistance than past right-wing presidents.

Presidential Outlook

In recent years, presidential elections have been held concurrently with interparty consultas whereby voters narrow the field of presidential candidates. As in 2022, there were separate left, center and mostly right-wing interparty votes. However, neither of the two current frontrunners, the left-wing Iván Cepeda nor the right-wing Abelardo De La Espriella participated in the primaries making them almost irrelevant. Colombian media, which loathes both De La Espriella and Cepeda, did its very best to play up the primaries and psychoanalyze the results. In the end, however, both the left-wing and centrist primaries garnered a laughable 600,000 votes.

The right-of-center Gran Consulta Por Colombia, however, secured a substantial 5.8 million votes with Paloma Valencia winning around 3.2 million of the total and centrist, Juan Daniel Oviedo around 1.2 million. These vote shares deserve recognition especially since Oviedo has officially agreed to join Valencia as her VP. Still, it remains to be seen if the ticket will make much of a difference in the broader race. We will have to see whether Valencia displaces De La Espriella as the frontrunner on the Right. Maybe they split the vote but presumably, one will endorse the other in a run-off. Uribistas are probably mulling which of the two candidates is more competitive in the run-off.

Stay tuned.

Just days after publishing the piece above, Colombia’s Consejo de Estado (Council of State) of the Supreme Court struck down President Gustavo Petro’s decree hiking the minimum wage a historic 23.7% for 2026. In characteristic jargon, the court argued that the decree did not follow proper procedure and would undergo a full judicial review. The process could take up to a year but in the meantime, the president has 30 days to issue a provisional but binding increase; the government has made clear it will decree the same rate of 23.7%.

The naked use of lawfare is yet another boon for Petro and ruling party candidate Iván Cepeda who have railed against the judiciary’s use of lawfare to the detriment of Colombian workers. Remarkably, moreover, members of the opposition, including right-wing frontrunner Aberlardo De La Espriella have subsequently u-turned in defense the hike.

In a remarkably thoughtful process, the minimum wage in Colombia is hiked on an annual basis via a tripartite agreement between organized labor, employer associations and the government. Colombian unions and the business community each propose and comprise on a rate increase that is later approved by the executive branch. Last year, neither employers nor unions reached a compromise after each proposed increases of 11% and 17%, respectively. When this occurs, the president can issue the final rate by executive order. Naturally, the administration opted to exploit this golden opportunity to hike the minimum wage far beyond what even labor had asked for.

Predictably, the business community howled, elite media clutched its pearls, and the opposition lined up to denounce the measure as reckless populism. “Think of our homeowners associations fees!”, said the middle and upper class residents of Colombian gated communities—many HOA dues are tied to the minimum wage and pay for the salaries of working class security guards for apartment buildings. A near universal chorus of centrist and opposition candidates including De La Espriella—as well as his former client and expresident, Álvaro Uribe—cast the hike as fiscally irresponsible and electoral theater.

But since the Supreme Court struck down Petro’s decree, something remarkable has happened. De La Espriella and virtually all other presidential candidates have come out in support of “castrochavismo’s” increase to the minimum wage. “We have not opposed, nor will we oppose, an increase in the minimum wage. What we do oppose is that this country has stagnated investment, experienced violence, drug trafficking, an excessive tax burden, mismanagement, and an inflated government. That is what needs to be corrected. Lower government spending, lower taxes for entrepreneurs and employers, and a decent minimum wage.”, said former president Uribe.

Like clockwork, the opposition has followed in the example of their Supreme Leader, defending Petro’s wage hike while also calling for lower taxes on businesses. Similarly, candidates that spent weeks warning of a Peronist apocalypse suddenly transformed into ardent defenders of the Colombian worker. The cynicism is staggering but the underlying economic reality for Colombians isn’t complicated. Wages in Colombia are so low that no politician would dare call for striping workers of a much needed gain. Even after the hike, Colombia’s minimum wage remains remarkably low in absolute terms — hovering around $350 dollars a month at current exchange rates.

In Mexico, former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), raised the minimum wage by roughly 20% a year during his six year term. But surely, Mexico must have experienced hyperinflation and mass unemployment, right? Quite the contrary, unemployment has fallen to a record low of 2.4%—among the lowest in OECD. Poverty has likewise fallen an astonishing 20% and businesses large and small have seen greater profits as a result workers’ increased buying power.

Consider, moreover, that inflation in Mexico has followed the same post pandemic trajectory as Brazil, a country with virtually no wage growth since 2012; Mexico’s inflation rate for 2026 has come in even lower than Brazil’s at 3.4%. Sure, Mexico’s central bank has kept high interest rates yet even its current rate of 8% is far lower than Colombia’s 11 and Brazil’s 15% despite far higher wage growth in Mexico. “Narcocommunist” Mexico has even seen a decline in informal labor under AMLO and Claudia Sheinbaum. Critics would do well to note that many informal workers will be more inclined to labor in minimum wage jobs as a result of hikes.

As I argued in the last post, Cepeda is by no means assured to win the presidency. His chances, however, are looking better by the day.

A year ago, I wrote the following piece based on reporting in Bogotá, Colombia with Venezuelans who attempted to vote in the July 28, 2024 election from abroad. The piece was never published, possibly on account of its provocative but glorious title. As I write these words from Bogotá again on a separate visit, I realize that the text may be of interest to subscribers. At a later date, I will eventually dedicate a piece exclusively to Maduro as the tradcath prince that post liberal conservatives never knew they wanted.

It was yet another unfair election in perennially crisis-stricken Venezuela. On 28 July, the country’s National Electoral Authority (CNE) proclaimed longtime leftist dictator, Nicolas Maduro the victor of presidential elections against opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez. In the months prior to the vote, the former diplomat Gonzalez inherited the mantle of popular opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado–herself barred from running for president by Maduro’s judicial cronies. Per the CNE, Maduro won a statistically impossible 51.2000 percent of the vote against Gonzalez’s comparably impossible 44.2000 percent.

A patchwork of opaque registration requirements effectively disenfranchised Venezuelans living abroad. Of the near 3 million Venezuelans living in neighboring Colombia, only 7000 were registered to vote on election day. Of those, less than half managed to cast a ballot. Reporting from Bogotá, multiple voters I spoke with in the city’s lone polling station complained that their registration was seemingly altered at the last minute to prevent them from voting. The crowd gathered nearby saw their hopes suddenly dashed when the regime proclaimed Maduro’s reelection to a third six-year term. “Fraud!”, yelled one demonstrator. “No one in their right mind would vote for that glutton!” By hook or crook, the ‘Son of Chávez’ prevailed yet again.

And yet, on the day that would have been Chávez’s 70th birthday, the late populist’s legacy endured in ways he likely never suspected. More than a week after Venezuelans went to the polls, even some of Maduro’s closest allies–such as Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner–called his victory into question. The reason? Receipts from the country’s voting machines suggested that the opposition Gonzalez secured 67 percent of the vote over Maduro’s 30 percent.

But where did these receipts come from and how can we abide by their veracity? By law, each political party in Venezuela is allowed the presence of volunteer electoral witnesses or testigos at any and all polling stations. Said witnesses are entitled to copies of the receipt tallies or actas printed by more than 30,000 voting machines. Each receipt features a unique, digital signature as well as a QR code that’s virtually impossible to falsify. On election night, an army of around 90,000 opposition witnesses secured around 80 percent of the receipts–in many cases under threats of violence by authorities. The digitized receipts were subsequently uploaded for all to see.

But who could have designed such a solid voting system? Why, it was none other than anti-imperialist hero, Hugo Chavez–the very same whom Trump attorney Sidney Powell accused of rigging the 2020 election in favor of Joe Biden. Like Trump, Chavez [rightfully] feared the prospect of fraud by Venezuela’s oligarchical establishment and went so far as to establish the aforementioned verification system for electoral receipts. Predictably, Chavez failed to foresee the inevitable decline in the Bolivarian Revolution’s popularity after the collapse of oil prices in 2014.

In Bogotá on election day, another demonstrator, Alberto–a former Chavista–explained to me how he previously served as a polling official during Chavez’s 2006 victory. In his words: “Chavez designed the system to make fraud impossible.” Indeed, while elections in Venezuela have long ceased to be free or fair, the regime had largely avoided mass fraud; preferring instead to intimidate voters in opposition strongholds, ban threatening candidates and/or coax the opposition into boycotting elections.

This was exactly what happened in 2018 when Maduro was last reelected with almost 70 percent of the vote against a crowded field of faux opposition candidates or alacranes. When I asked Alberto what he thought about the opposition’s decision to boycott that election, he said: “They’re much of the reason we’re in this mess! If they had at least participated and Maduro cheated, they would have been able to prove it. Instead, they pursued the Guaidó debacle.” In 2019, president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó self-declared himself president, reasoning that Maduro’s 2018 victory was illegitimate and he was next in line for the presidency.

And unlike in 2018, the regime-aligned CNE refused to release the receipts in its possession–alleging hacker attacks from both North Macedonia and Elon Musk. Subsequent protests elicited a harsher than usual crackdown with around 20 killed and 2000 arrested. Authorities also threatened to arrest Machado and Gonzalez for charges of ‘terrorism’.

Beyond Venezuela, erstwhile allies Colombia, Brazil similarly refused to recognize a victor in the election and called on Maduro to both publish the CNE’s receipts and accept a negotiated amnesty [and possible transition] with the opposition. Regardless of likely ideological sympathies, both Brazil and Colombia have discrete interests with regards to Venezuela–not least of which is the certainty that increased instability will lead to a renewed flood of Venezuelan migrants onto their borders.

At the time, many of my closest contacts in Venezuela went dark as the government encouraged its remaining supporters to report neighbors and acquaintances for ‘subversive activities’. Like his ally, Daniel Ortega, Maduro inevitably came to the conclusion that lethal force is necessary to continue his rule.

A year after one of the most egregious frauds in history, a disturbing number of oxymoronic “anti-imperialists” in the Latin American and international left continue to cling to the delusion that Maduro was democratically elected and US sanctions justify torture and mass killings. Leftists must wake up to the reality that scaremongering over “turning into Venezuela” will continue to be compelling to millions of voters in countries like Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Brazil so long as prominent figures like Rafael Correa continue to peddle Maduro apologia.

Approximately 13% of registered voters took part in the June elections—a record low for a federal election in Mexico. Worse, the number of invalid and blank ballots was also historic at over 20% of the vote; in some cases, null and blank votes exceeded those of the winning candidates. Most candidates were complete unknowns to the vast majority of voters and an overly complicated ballot caused unnecessary confusion. To be sure, many in the opposition boycotted the election although that accounts for around a third of the electorate at most.

Of course, if your media diet comes from opposition and English language sources (the two are functionally the same), you probably heard tales of elected ‘narco-judges’ and the broader downfall of Mexican democracy. Never mind the fact that one of the election’s most virulent critics—former president Ernesto Zedillo—packed the entirety of the Supreme Court in 1994.

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So what gives? Is there any merit to the claims?

I’ll be transparent and admit that I personally like Gonzalez. At the same time, I also despise both Noboa and Correa so take what you will from that.

In the more than six weeks since the election, I have been unable to find conclusive proof of widespread fraud. That said, it’s fair to say that various aspects about the vote were irregular. Multiple candidates were arbitrarily disqualified in order to consolidate the vote for Noboa, Correísmo was subject to a litany of lawfare and at least some degree of intimidation was exerted on Gonzalez voters. Polls were also off in a way that boggles the mind. Still, absent all the circumstantial and more substantive irregularities, it’s plausible that Noboa would still have pulled out the win though probably by much less.

In the lead up to the run-off, most polls had Gonzalez ahead in a tight race. She also secured the support of third-place indigenous candidate Leonidas Iza though parts of his party backed Noboa. It’s thus strange that Gonzalez obtained virtually the same result in the run-off as in the first round–at around 44%. Of the two exit polls released the day of the run-off, one showed Noboa winning, the other Gonzalez. A state of exception was also declared in seven mostly Correísta provinces prior to the vote. OAS and EU observers criticized the state of exception but said they found no evidence of widespread fraud. Ironically, Noboa claimed that the results of the first round were fraudulent which the OAS and EU also said was unfounded.

The broader political environment wasn’t favorable towards the incumbent. The Ecuadorian Right has presided over eight years of neoliberal austerity, corruption scandals–and more recently–a collapsing energy grid and mass criminal violence. Noboa himself took office following a snap election prompted by a corruption scandal involving his predecessor’s links to the Albanian mafia. The country has similarly been plagued by routine blackouts and remains deeply indebted to the IMF amid low economic growth.

Ecuador also holds the ignominious title of the world’s most violent country in peacetime, with homicides at around 40 per 100,000. In 2023, the presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated by cartel hitmen. Amid a wave of narco terror following the January, 2024 prison escape of alias ‘Fito’–who remains at large–Noboa instituted a militarized crackdown against traffickers with mixed results. After a year-long lull in violence, recent months have seen a record number of homicides with over 700 in February.

Further, Noboa and his elite allies happily quashed rivals on both the Left and the Right. A self-described ‘center-left’ neoliberal, the president removed his Milei-esque Vice President, Veronica Abad from office via woke lawfare; Abad was convicted of engaging in ‘gender violence’ against a fellow cabinet official and was stripped of her political rights including the right to vote. Still another government-aligned court suspended the candidacy of right-wing rival Jan Topic–a mercenary-businessman promising a Bukele-style crackdown who stood to divide the Right in the first round.

Of course, Correísmo has been the chief victim of conventional lawfare. In 2020, Correa was convicted by Attorney General Diana Salazar of ‘psychically inducing’ his subordinates into accepting bribes. Chats obtained by Dropsite News suggest that Salazar and the FBI distorted evidence in order to frame Correa as the intellectual author of Villavicencio’s murder during the 2023 campaign; the late candidate had been a longstanding critic of the former president. Days before the run-off, Villavicencio’s widow proclaimed that Salazar had manipulated her into incriminating Correísmo for her husband’s murder.

Irregularities aside, there are essentially two factors that explain Noboa’s nonetheless substantial support. The first is that he had been in office for barely 15 months at a time when an unprecedented security crisis generated a rally-around-the-flag effect. I can see many wanting to give him the benefit of the doubt and more time in office. At the same time, Correísmo’s third consecutive loss for the presidency suggests that millions of Ecuadorians have a justified fear of Bolivarianism. During the run-off, the specter of Maduro’s historic fraud in 2024 served as a major crutch for the González campaign. The same people that now cry foul in Ecuador will tell you straight faced that Maduro’s win in 2024 wasn’t fraudulent.

While Bolivarian apologia remains common among much of the Latin American Left; in recent years, leaders such as Brazil’s Lula and Colombia’s Petro have been forced to take a harder line against their tyrannical peers. The same isn’t true of Correísmo and its eponymous leader. During the former president’s ten-year rule, Ecuador joined the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) currently composed of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia as well as a number of Caribbean countries. In the 2000s, the bloc largely served as a vehicle for Venezuelan soft power via the country’s oil boom under Hugo Chavez.

Those familiar with the neoconservative narrative surrounding the São Paulo Forum have likely heard complaints that its members are all puppets of the Cuban regime. In reality, the Forum is a grouping of all the center-left parties in the hemisphere. ALBA, on the other hand, is a different story. Today, the alliance’s material influence has diminished though its leaders continue to offer one another political support in their respective efforts to stifle ‘bourgeois democracy’.

Like his Bolivarian peers, Correa, unsurprisingly, annulled term limits though he was prevented from running for a fourth term in 2017. In a September interview on his weekly TV show on Russian state media, Correa and Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez celebrated Maduro’s reelection as a testament to the regime’s righteous struggle against US imperialism. Cruel and counterproductive as Washington’s sanctions may have been, it’s quite obvious that the unwavering constant of Bolivarianism is staying in office no matter the cost.

González ran an admirable populist campaign centered around her oligarch opponent’s more than apparent failings and questionable associations. Prior to the run-off, Noboa traveled to Mar-a-Lago for a photo-op with Donald Trump and invited Blackwater CEO Erik Prince and his mercenaries to assist with anti-crime activities; during a campaign stint, Prince claimed that Correa had fathered an illegitimate child with Gonzalez. Like Elon Musk, accusations of self-dealing and conflicts of interest between Noboa’s family businesses and the state have dogged his presidency.

It remains to be seen whether Noboa can make meaningful inroads in solving the country’s energy and security crises. Multiple investigations have found that the president’s banana empire has routinely transported cocaine on its vessels. While Noboa and his family aren’t criminally liable for the findings–and claim to have cooperated with authorities–it speaks volumes that the president has been unable to curb drug trafficking within his own businesses.

Despite his despotic use of the country’s courts, the reality is that Noboa lacks the institutional control needed to massively detain suspected criminals on the same scale as El Salvador. The ruling National Democratic Action Party lacks a majority in congress and will face stiff opposition from Correísmo. The irony of course is that any attempt at perpetuating autocratic governance will likely reduce crime in the long term. Whether it’s Bukele’s El Salvador or Ortega’s Nicaragua, one-party dictatorships excel at controlling crime by way of weak or non-existent individual rights. In recent years, even Venezuela has made strides in lowering homicides in part via extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals in poor neighborhoods.

Given Noboa’s propensity towards scandal, it’s not unlikely he could suffer the same fate as his predecessor Guillermo Lasso. Should this occur, it will be harder to sell Bolivarian scaremongering to an irate electorate–or win with the help of lawfare and other shenanigans. Winning by default, however, is almost meaningless in my book. If and when Correísmo eventually returns to power, the movement will need to decide whether it intends to follow a different path from its ruinous peers. For the moment, however, and regardless of irregularities, Correísmo must contend with the fact that far too many voters prefer a centrist despot to a Bolivarian one.

Just three years ago, the PS secured an outright majority in the unicameral Assembly of the Republic–its second best result in five decades. Then in 2024, Costa resigned in disgrace amid a sprawling corruption scandal that landed his Chief of Staff in prison. The sad truth, however, is that scandal and corruption are endemic to Portuguese politics. Yesterday’s snap election was triggered by the revelations that PM Montenegro was receiving monthly payments from government contractors. In the lead up to the election, three Chega MPs also committed cartoonish crimes including stealing airport luggage, drunk driving and paying minors for oral sex.

It’s thus all the more notable that Chega’s gains have come at the expense of Portugal’s center-and-populist left. In 2019, the combined vote share of the PS as well as the hard-left Communist Party (PC) and Left Bloc (BE) totaled 52.1 percent. By 2025, this figure fell to 28.4 percent with the PC and BE falling from 15.8 to 5 percent; support for the center-right AD has remained relatively stable between the mid-20s to low 30s. As elsewhere in Europe and North America—the reality is that the populist right’s cannibalization of the Left in Portugal largely boils down to a single issue: immigration.

Between 2020 and 2024, the number of foreign citizens in Portugal more than doubled from around 620,000 to 1.54 million; this, in a country of just 10.4 million. While many progressives rejoice at the thought of a former colonizer becoming more diverse, the country’s working class majority, unsurprisingly, sees things differently. Around 70 percent of Portuguese voters favor less immigration while an even higher share—around 80 percent—favor restrictions on emigration.

For decades–and particularly at the height of EU-imposed austerity during the 2010s–millions fled Portugal in search of jobs elsewhere in Europe. Contrary to the narrative of EU aparatchicks, much of the ‘Portuguese Miracle’ was a sham though Costa’s Socialists managed to reverse some of its predecessor's cuts and raise the minimum wage by around 30 percent. Higher growth of around 3 percent since 2017 has been driven largely by tourism and real estate—and has yet to make up for chronically low growth of 1 percent during the 2000s and most of the 2010s. Despite hikes, moreover, Portuguese wages continue to be among the lowest in Europe at just €13.7-an-hour.

The irony is that austerity and low wages made Portugal unappealing to non-lusophone low-skilled migrants until the pandemic. Policymakers and businesses subsequently pushed for higher immigration due to a lack of workers and low birth rates; the unthinkable alternative being that businesses–as opposed to the government–raise wages for low-skilled native workers. Policymakers also doubled down on financialization and the ‘knowledge economy’ by offering a trove of incentives to remote foreign workers as well as Golden Visas for foreigners that purchase real estate. The result was that low-skilled migrants have undercut native labor as affluent foreigners have similarly priced out locals, particularly in Lisbon and Porto.

While efforts have been made to place restrictions on remote foreign workers and reform the golden visa program, overall rates of immigration remain at record highs. In the view of affluent progressives in and outside of Portugal, however, working class voters went from being enlightened leftists to brainwashed xenophobes within the short span of three years.

Predictably, Socialist leader Pedro Nuno Santos’ attempts to adopt a tougher line immigration was met with derision from activist sectors for ‘stigmatizing migrants and copying the far-right’. Completely detached from reality, Jacobin similarly proclaimed that ‘the success of Iberian socialists affirms that leftists need not embrace immigration restrictionism’. Never mind the collapse of the Portuguese Left or the fact that Pedro Sanchez’s minority governments have barely scraped by against the Spanish Right

This self-serving notion–based on remarkably poor scholarship from the Progressive Politics Research Network (PPRNet)—has sadly become gospel on the mass migration Left. Yet, rooted in the aforementioned findings is a revealing admission. “The average social democratic voter today is unlikely to be an industrial worker. The data also shows much of this new [college-educated] constituency is actually both culturally progressive and economically leftwing.”, says PPRNet cofounder and Oxford professor Tarik Abou-Chadi. The tacit admission being that progressives would need to actually appeal to workers–for example by restricting immigration–in order to revert the trend of college-educated Brahminization. Never mind the fact that Abou-Chadi celebrated the ruling stripping Marine Le Pen of her political rights as ‘good for liberal democracy’.

The essence of politics 101 that progressives deliberately circumvent when it comes to immigration is that effective political persuasion depends on a combination of credible rhetoric and corresponding action on policy.

In the case of the UK’s lame duck Labour government, the party has acknowledged worker views on immigration but failed to actually reduce mass migration. Conversely, Joe Biden surprisingly—if cynically—reduced border crossings by 80 percent in 2024 via executive actions. But because these were greeted by affluent progressives as ‘fascism’, the administration failed to campaign on reducing immigration and resorted to vague promises of ‘securing the border’; for this reason, most Americans were probably unaware that immigration fell at all in 2024 (and even then, Trump’s win likely would’ve been more resounding had Biden kept the border open like progressives wanted him to).

Whether it’s in the UK, US or in Portugal, the reality is that left-of-center parties need to restore credibility on immigration if they hope to stand a chance at winning back working class voters. This can be done through common sense rhetoric that slams mass migration progressives and makes clear that those that immigrate illegally or fraudulently claim asylum will be swiftly deported. This doesn’t mean demonizing migrants–or sending non-criminals to Nayib Bukele’s CECOT—but it does entail alienating affluent cosmopolitans that benefit from an endless supply of undocumented maids and landscapers. As for the more numerous working class, it’s true that voters that value immigration above all else will almost always vote for the Right regardless. Most workers, however, consider immigration in tandem with other issues including the minimum wage and health care.

The only left-wing parties in Europe that arouse resounding working class support are Denmark and Slovakia’s Social Democrats, both of which refer to mass, low-skilled and irregular immigration as stables of unbridled capitalism. Consider the following bit of wisdom from Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen: “High levels of immigration can undermine [social] cohesion while imposing burdens on the working class that more affluent voters escape, such as strained benefit programs, crowded schools and increased competition for housing and blue-collar jobs. Working class families know this from experience. Affluent leftists pretend otherwise and then lecture less privileged voters about their supposed intolerance.”

YAAAS QUEEN, STICK IT TO DEM’ PMCs!!

Progressives must come to terms with the fact that workers regard their views on immigration in a manner analogous to libertarian’s fetishization of trickle-down economics (in practice, both are one and the same). Indeed, it remains an open question that the incoherent and despicable Chega—which has oscillated erratically between Muskian libertarianism and welfare populism—will eventually succeed in gaining power, let alone delivering on its promises. Should the Portuguese—or any other—Left attempt the hard work of winning back their former constituents, they will reap inevitable rewards from the populist-right in the long-term.